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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I
Case No. 900552-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ANA LILIA GONZALES,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1990), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Was there sufficient evidence that defendant acted

with intent to defraud when she wrote and tendered for value a
check belonging to another?

Evidence and all inferences which

may reasonably be drawn from it are reviewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury. "[A jury conviction may be
reversed] for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable

that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."
2.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
Did the trial court properly exclude testimony

corroborative of defendant's prior testimony on the issue of
defendant's intent to defraud?

A trial court's ruling on

evidentiary matters is reviewed only for a clear abuse of
discretion and will not be interfered with unless there is the
likelihood that injustice resulted.

State v. McClain, 706 P.2d

603, 604 (Utah 1985).l
3.

Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence

the checkbook from which defendant wrote the check forming the
basis of the forgery charge, offered as circumstantial evidence
of her acting with intent to defraud?

Because this question

concerns the admissibility of evidence it should be reviewed
under the standard set forth in paragraph 2, above.
4.

Did the trial court properly refuse defendant's

jury instruction on reasonable doubt?

"An appeal challenging the

refusal to give jury instructions presents a question of law

1

Defendant indicates that the appropriate standard of review
for issues two and three is that applied to assignments of
constitutional error, to wit: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Appellant's brief at 2, par. 2 and 3). However, evidentiary
standards and constitutional guarantees are not necessarily
coextensive. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-5 (Utah 1987)
(limitation on defendant's right to cross-examine not necessarily
coextensive
with
defendant's
constitutional
right
of
confrontation). Here, defendant has not suggested that the trial
court's evidentiary rulings have constitutional dimension, nor has
defendant briefed the issue.
-2-

only. Therefore, . . . no particular deference to the trial
court's rulings [is granted]".

State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328,

1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ana Lilia Gonzalez, was charged by
information with forgery, a second degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990) (R. 6-7). Following a trial by jury she
was convicted and sentenced to a term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years, but was granted a stay and placed on
probation (R. 79-80).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed testimony was that on January 21, 1990,
at the Smith's food store located at Eighth South and Ninth East,
Salt Lake City, defendant purchased goods worth $262.28 with a
check written in the amount of $300.00 on an account belonging to
a Christy Lynn Cotner (T. 44-48, 113-16 and State's exhibit 1).
In defense of her conduct defendant testified that on the
preceding evening she attended a party in Salt Lake City where
she first met a Sherry or Shannon O'Neill (T. 108). O'Neill,
somewhat intoxicated, bragged that her sister loaned O'Neill her
checks for O'Neill to use in explaining how she had obtained an
outfit that defendant admired (T. 108-9).
-3-

Later in the evening

defendant loaned O'Neill "a couple bucks" with the understanding
that O'Neill would repay her.

O'Neill was unable to repay

defendant that evening and so defendant returned the following
morning (T. 109-10).

Still without cash and needing some

groceries, O'Neill requested defendant pick up some items for her
and suggested that defendant write a check to cover the amount
owed (T. 111-12).
Defendant was accompanied to the Smith's by two men and
a woman and her child (T.112).

Defendant testified that the

three adults accompanying her selected many items from all around
the store, explaining to defendant that they would repay O'Neill,
but that she selected nothing for herself (T. 113-15).

Following

the tally of items, defendant testified, she wrote on the check
the amount of $300.00, the date and the payee's name, "Smith's".
Defendant also testified O'Neill, and not she, had earlier signed
the check at defendant's insistence (T. 116-17).
Christina Taylor, cashier, testified that she
particularly noticed that the items purchased by defendant and
her companions were expensive and unusual, consisting largely of
makeup, vitamins, cigarettes and body building things (T. 45,
56).

When the items had been tallied, defendant asked one of her

male companions how much she should write the check for, and he
suggested that she make it for $300.00, which would leave about
$37.00 in cash (T. 47). Taylor testified that defendant then
wrote the check to Smith's for $300.00, signed and dated it, tore
it from a checkbook which was contained in a wallet and handed it
-4-

to her along with Cotner's check guarantee VISA card and Smith's
casher card (T. 48, 144-45 and State's Exhibits 2 and 3).
Taylor, considering that there might be a problem with the
transaction because of the unusual purchases, then gave the check
to Richard Anderson, on-duty manager, for verfication (T. 5657). 2
Both Taylor and Anderson testified that defendant just
stood at the checkout counter, making no attempt to leave the
store, even while Anderson hollered for assistance to prevent
defendant's companions from exiting the store with the bagged
items or while he escorted her to his office (T. 58, 70-73).
However, Anderson also testifed that he did not believe that
defendant could have escaped from the time he had decided that
the check was a forgery because of the manpower that he had
summoned (T. 74). Following Anderson's verifying telephone call,

2

Anderson may also have witnessed defendant sign the check,
but the record is unclear on this point:
[Prosecutor]:
Why don't you describe to the
jury what you were doing when you first
observed Ms. Gonzalez?
[Anderson]:
I was just walking by the
checkstand and Christina was ringing up the
order. I went in, finished bagging for her,
put the stuff in the cart, you know, and she
was finished writing her signature on the
check and Christina wanted me to okay it, so,
you know, she ripped it out and I looked at it
and for the amount, you know, and all she had,
she didn't have a driver's license, just a
guarantee card, so we questioned it.
(T. 62).
-5-

Cotner appeared at Smith's and identified the wallet, checkbook,
VISA and Smith's cards used by defendant as her own (T. 62-63,
77).

Cotner testified that the day before she had lost her purse

containing the items used by defendant in a store at a mall where
she noticed the same man who was with defendant at Smith's. She
did not, however, see defendant at the mall the day before (T.
76-77, 79, 88-89).

Cotner also testified that she had never met

defendant before nor authorized defendant to use her name,
guarantee card or checking account (T. 79).
Salt Lake City police officer Jason Snow interviewed
defendant at Smith's concerning this incident (T. 90-91).

He

testified that during his interview of defendant and following
the giving of appropriate Miranda warnings, defendant stated that
she had received the checkbook from O'Neill who had told her that
she (O'Neill) had "passed" a few checks around town and that
defendant should try it (T. 92, 96-98).
Defendant testified that she had no idea that there was
a problem in filling in the check while she was doing it and that
she was not trying to defraud either Smith's or Cotner (T. 123).
In support both defendant and her mother, Margarita Gonzalez,
testified that on a few occasions about one and one-half years
prior, when defendant was seventeen years old, Margarita gave
defendant permission to use her checkbook and to sign her name in
purchasing some personal items (T. 105-6, 132-34).
At trial the State offered Cotner's checkbook as
evidence of defendant's culpable state of mind (T. 79). The
-6-

trial court received the evidence over defendant's objection (T.
80-5 and State's Exhibit 4). Also, the trial court sustained the
State's objection to the testimony of Jeff Phillips, offered to
corroborate defendant's rendition of O'Neill's statement about
the checkbook and to thus establish defendant's innocent state of
mind when she subsequently wrote the check (T. 162-63).3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The State provided sufficient evidence on which the
jury could find defendant guilty. That evidence consisted most
substantially of two witnesses' testimony that defendant signed a
check on a stranger's account, a point defendant concedes for the
purposes of appeal, plus a police officer's testimony that
defendant told him that she had received the checkbook from
O'Neill with the suggestion that defendant also try "passing"
some checks. The jury might also have reasonably doubted
defendant's story and believed other circumstantial evidence
offered to prove defendant's culpable state of mind.
POINT II
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing
to admit the testimony of defense witness Phillips.

Rule 403,

Utah Rules of Evidence, and federal and Utah case law provide for
the exclusion of cumulative testimony in appropriate cases. The

3

Phillips was, however, permitted to testify that he did hear
O'Neill make a statement about a checkbook and that defendant was
in O'Neill's immediate vicinity when the statement was made
(T. 137-38).
-7-

testimony was cumulative of that previously given by defendant.
Even if it was error to exclude the witness's testimony as to
what he heard O'Neill say about the checkbook that error was
harmless because (1) the witness was allowed to testify to
substantially the same matter that defendant had previously
testified to; (2) the excluded testimony could not have
established defendant's innocent state of mind; and (3) there was
no evidence that the jury was misled by not hearing the excluded
testimony.
POINT III
The trial court properly admitted the stolen checkbook
into evidence. Defendant's possession of a stolen checkbook was
relevant to establishing defendant's culpable state of mind, to
wit: that in writing a check belonging to Cotner she acted with
purpose to defraud Smith's and Cotner. The probative value of
defendant's possession of a stolen checkbook was not outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice because proof of defendant's
culpable state of mind required the marshalling of all available
evidence while, on the other hand, defendant was unable to show
that the admission of the checkbook misled the jury in its
consideration of the evidence. Also, the State stated to the jury
in closing that defendant was not charged with theft or anything
other than forgery, and the trial court's instructions
effectively reinforced that statement.

-8-

POINT IV
The reasonable doubt instruction used in this trial is
precisely that recently approved in State v. Pederson, 802 P. 2d
1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The instruction contains none of the
language found objectionable in the instruction found
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990),
and is otherwise similar to that considered in Cage but not
regarded as objectionable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT DEFENDANT SIGNED A
CHECK ON THE ACCOUNT OF A STRANGER AND THAT
SHE KNEW THAT THE CHECKBOOK HAD BEEN USED TO
"PASS" CHECKS, ALONG WITH REASONABLE
INFERENCES STEMMING FROM DEFENDANT'S
BEHAVIOR, WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT
ACTED WITH A PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD.
Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that
her writing a check to Smith's food store on an account belonging
to Cotner was undertaken with a purpose to defraud.

When

reviewing a conviction by a jury, an appellate court "do[es] not
substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury.

'It is the

exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.'"

State v. Booker,

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d
229, 231 (Utah 1980)).

The court Mreview[s] the evidence and all

inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury."
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

State v. Petree, 659

Viewing the evidence of this case in
-9-

the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the State clearly
provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant did act with
intent to defraud when she attempted to pass Cotner's check at
Smith's Food King.
Two witnesses testified that defendant, contrary to her
testimony, signed the check in question using the name of Christy
Cotner, the true owner of the account (T. 62, 145). Cotner
testified that defendant was unknown to her prior to this check
passing incident and never had her authorization to use her name,
guarantee card or checking account (T. 79). Officer Snow
testified that defendant told him that she had received the
checkbook from O'Neill who stated that she (O'Neill) had "passed"
some of the checks around town and that defendant might also try
doing it (T. 92).A
The jury might also reasonably have doubted defendant's
credibility and thereby inferred her guilty state of mind from
other evidence, particularly that offered by defendant herself.
Defendant claims that she only wrote the check in reliance on
O'Neill's apparent authority to authorize such a transaction.
Yet even a naive individual could not be expected to assume that
a stranger having apparent authority to use her "sister's"

A

On cross-examination, when pressed about whether he might
have been mistaken about the substance and meaning of defendant's
statement about her receipt of the checkbook, officer Snow
testified with assurance that defendant definitely used the word
"passed" which in that context clearly indicated O'Neill's, and
consequently defendant's, knowledge that the checks were the
instruments of forgery (T. 97-98).
-10-

checkbook could in any proper way transfer that authority to yet
another stanger, such as defendant.

In this sense defendant's

prior experience in using her mother's checkbook was only
remotely similar to her use of Cotner's checkbook in this case.5
5

Defendant's testimony suggests that her insistence that
O'Neill sign the check, rather than she who did not have permission
herself to sign it, is further evidence of her good faith (T. 117).
However, the jury might reasonably have inferred from this
circumstance, if true, that defendant was fully aware of the
wrongfulness of these machinations and simply felt the need to have
another share in her guilt. Moreover, though defendant argues
strenuously that she believed O'Neill had authority to use the
checkbook, the record clearly suggests that she might really have
been skeptical of such alleged authority:
[Defense counsel]:
And during the time -that
you were at the party that night, was there
any conversation that came up about a
checkbook that Shannon or Sherry O'Neill had?
[Defendant]:
Miss O'Neill was a little more
intoxicated than other people that were there
and she was really loud, kind of the scene of
the whole party, and she was — I liked her
outfit that she had and the girls that were
there were asking her where she had gotten it
from and she started bragging how her sister
loaned her her checks for her to use and we
were just kind of — well, we were kind of
surprised because my sister wouldn't do that
and exceed Tsicl over a lot of checks, as many
as she said that she did.
[Defense counsel]:
So she'd given you the
impression that she'd been able to use that
checkbook —
[Defendant]:

Yes.

[Defense counsel]:
[Defendant]:
[Prosecution]:
Honor.

—

to buy stuff?

Yes.
I'll object as leading, your
(continued...)
-11-

Defendant argues that her remaining by the checkout
stand while the check was being verified, without an attempt to
flee then or while she was being escorted to the manager's
office, evidences her innocent state of mind.

However, Anderson

testified that defendant could not have escaped from the store
once he determined the check was a forgery (T. 74). 6 Thus, in
the jury's eyes, defendant's apparently reserved demeanor may
simply have reflected a realistic assessment of a rapidly
deteriorating situation.
Defendant also cites authority for the proposition that
the State has the burden of proving in a forgery case that the
defendant not only used the name of another but that he did so
without authority.
(Utah 1979).

See State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1317-18

In fact Collins generally stands for precisely the

opposite proposition since, as the case points out, section 76-6501 was amended so as to require a showing of conduct undertaken
without authority only in instances in which the actor alters

the

writing of another, whereas no other conduct culpable under the
statute requires such showing.

In this case defendant was

charged and tried under subsection (l)(b) which does not require

5

(...continued)
[The Court]:
Sustained.
(T. 108-9)6

The futility of escape was demonstrated by Smith's employees
preventing defendant's remaining male companion from running off
(T. 67-68, 119).
-12-

a showing of unauthorized conduct as an express element of the
crime of forgery (R.6 and 62).
While the State was not required to show that defendant
acted without Cotner's authority in order to satisfy an express
requirement of section 76-6-501, the State was required to show
that defendant acted with intent to defraud. Such proof
necessarily entailed showing that defendant could not have
believed, at some level, that in writing a check on a stranger's
account she was acting innocently.

In carrying that burden, as

argued above, the State necessarily refuted defendant's defense
that she naively and in good faith relied on O'Neill's apparent
authority.7
POINT II
THE EXCLUSION OF CUMULATIVE TESTIMONY WAS
WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND WAS,
AT MOST, HARMLESS ERROR, SINCE THE WITNESS
WAS NONETHELESS ALLOWED TO GIVE THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY, AND SUCH TESTIMONY
COULD NOT HAVE PROVED DEFENDANT'S INNOCENT
STATE OF MIND.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, allows the exclusion
of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
7

Defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden of
disproving her alleged reliance on O'Neill's assertions of
authority, citing State v. Wood, 648 p.2d 71 (Utah 1981), for the
proposition that the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the
existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once
the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense. Id., at 82
n.7.
The State's proof of defendant's intent to defraud
necessarily involved the refutation of defendant's alleged
reliance. The jury was entitled to believe the State's witnesses
and to disbelieve defendant and her witnesses.
Further,
defendant's alledged reliance on another's apparent authority is
not an affirmative defense. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-301 to -308
(1990). Thus Wood has no special application to this case.
-13-

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the juryf or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." (emphasis added).

In Utah, Rule 403 evidentiary

decisions are left to the trial court's discretion and are not
overturned "unless the abuse of discretion is so severe that it
results in a likelihood of injustice."

State v. Knowles, 709

P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d
942, 944 (Utah 1982)).

"The [trial] court retains considerable

latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that
which is cumulative."

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127

(1974).
In this case, defendant attempted to offer the
testimony of Jeff Phillips as to the substance of O'Neill's
statement about her alleged right to use the stolen checkbook (T.
137).

The trial court sustained the State's objection on the

ground that such testimony was cumulative (T. 162-63).

"Evidence

is cumulative when it replicates other admitted evidence. . . . "
United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 643 (1983).

The evidence

which defendant sought to elicit from Phillips was cumulative in
that it was merely intended to r€*plicate defendant's testimony
previously offered on the same point (T. 108-09, 137 and 162).

Utah law gives the trial judge wide discretion on the
admission of Rule 403 evidence.

See Knowles, 709 P.2d at 312.

Utah courts have also specifically ruled on the admission of
-14-

cumulative evidence, giving the trial court broad power to admit
or exclude.

See State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988)

(admission of prosecutor's letter would have added nothing to
facts heard by jury); State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah
1989) (defendant's extended cross-examination of ex-wife properly
denied where defendant allowed to introduce evidence of ex-wife's
bias).

"In the case of cumulative evidence, the trial judge

clearly must have wide discretion to exclude if he is to conduct
a trial efficiently."

1

J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's

Evidence 403:97-98 (1990).
In this case the trial court properly excluded
Phillips's testimony because it was merely duplicative of
testimony that defendant had already given about what O'Neill had
told defendant about her alleged right to use the checkbook.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion and
should have admitted the evidence, the error was nevertheless
harmless because both defendant and Phillips were allowed to
testify to the substance of the point defendant desired to make.
In State v. Sorenson, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980), the trial court
erroneously excluded the defendant's testimony on a crucial point
as hearsay.

At a later point in the trial, however, the

defendant testified without objection to the equivalent of the
earlier excluded testimony.

The court held that any error in

excluding the testimony was cured when the equivalent testimony
was later admitted.

.Id,, at 337-38.

"In short, defendant had the

benefit of the evidence which at one point was excluded but was
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later admitted.

There was no prejudicial error committed in the

exclusion of evidence by the trial court.M Ibid.
In this case defendant was allowed to testify as to the
substance of O'Neill's statement concerning the use of the
checkbook. More importantly, Phillips, while precluded from
testifying on the same matter, was nonetheless allowed to state
that O'Neill had made a statement about the checkbook in
defendant's immediate presence (T. 137-138). In the context in
which Phillips delivered that testimony a jury might reasonably
have considered that defendant's recollection of O'Neill's
statement was accurate8.
Defendant argues that under United States v.
Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984), the exclusion of
Phillips's testimony cannot be considered harmless error.

In

Eisenstein, the defendant sought to admit the corroborative
testimony of his attorney to prove that the defendant had in fact
given full disclosure to the attorney and had relied on advice of
counsel in ignoring currency disclosure laws. Ld. at 1542-43.
The testimony was excluded on hearsay grounds.

The Eleventh

Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that the exclusion was
harmless as being merely cumulative of the defendant's testimony
on the same point where the defendant's credibility on a crucial
point was at issue. J[d. at 1546.

8

Also, as in Sorenson, defendant "did not make a proffer that
indicated the evidence [she] sought to introduce went beyond the
fact . . . as admitted in subsequent testimony." JId. at 338 n.7.
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Notwithstanding the holding in Eisenstein, "[i]t is
always within the discretion of the trial judge to deny a party
the opportunity to present cumulative evidence bearing solely on
credibility."

United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 834-35

(6th Cir. 1982) (corroborative testimony of witness vouching for
the credibility of another witness had only minor "incremental
probity" and thus properly excluded)(citations omitted).

See

also State v. Johnson, 79 Utah 263, 267, 9 P.2d 186, 187 (1932)
(limitation of defendant's direct examination of corroborative
witness not error where defendant permitted to give substantively
similar evidence); accord State v. Mivahira, 6 Haw. App. 320,
327, 721 P.2d 718, 722 (1986).
This case is distinguishable from Eisenstein. There the
defense was based entirely on defendant's being able to establish
that he had made full disclosure to his attorney upon whose
advice he then relied.

Thus the attorney was the best witness to

the crucial fact of defendant's disclosure.

In this case

Phillip's testimony did not have equivalent value because, at
best, it only corroborated that defendant and Phillips heard the
same statement. However, it could not have proved with any
assurance defendant's state of mind, because defendant herself
testified first that she was skeptical of O'Neill's right to use
the checkbook and then, immediately thereafter, following her
counsel's guiding hand, that she had gotten the impression that
O'Neill had been able to use the checkbook. (See Appellee's Brief
at 11 n.5).

Thus, in the face of such equivocal testimony the
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jury might well have believed that O'Neill made a statement about
her use of the checkbook, but it would necessarily have been
uncertain about the effect of such statement on defendant's state
of mind.
In sum, Phillips's excluded testimony could not have
had a substantial impact on the jury*

In Worthen, commenting on

testimony of dubious value, the court stated:
In actuality, the opinion would have added
nothing to the facts the jury heard. The
jury was, of course, able to evaluate the
evidence by itself, and there is no evidence
in the record that the jury was misled by not
hearing the prosecutor's testimony or knowing
about the relevant part of the letter.
Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
POINT III
THE CHECKBOOK WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AS
RELEVANT, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S PURPOSE TO DEFRAUD. ANY PREJUDICE
THAT MIGHT HAVE RESULTED FROM ITS ADMISSION
WAS CURED BY THE STATE'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT
DEFENDANT HAS NOT BEEN CHARGED WITH THEFT AND
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS REINFORCING
THE POINT.
At trial defendant objected to the admission of the
checkbook, State's exhibit 4, from which she wrote the check in
question (T. 80). The trial court admitted exhibit 4, ruling
that it was relevant to the determination of defendant's state of
mind (T. 81-5).

Defendant contends that exhibit 4 should have

been excluded because no connection was made between her actions
and the checkbook as a whole (T. 85). The contention is without
sufficient merit.
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Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines relevant
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence."

See Worthen, 765 P.2d at 846 ("not highly

persuasive" letter tending to show defendant abusive nonetheless
admissible under rule 401). Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence,
states, in pertinent part, that "[a]11 relevant evidence is
admissible" unless it is excludable under another rule.

In

admitting evidence under rule 402, the trial court is not
reversed unless it has abused its discretion. Terry v. Zion's
Corp. Mercantile, 605 P.2d 314, 322-23 (Utah 1979).
In this case no such abuse took place. Mental state is
rarely susceptible to direct proof and generally must be proved
by circumstantial evidence.

See State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555,

558 (Utah 1985); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah
1983).

The checkbook was in the defendant's possession when she

was detained at the supermarket (T. 66). Cotner, the owner of
the check, testified that a signature other than her own had been
made next to her signature on a voided check in the checkbook (T.
78).

Defendant was in possession of the entire stolen checkbook

which allowed her to study Cotner's genuine signature even if she
did not actually practice it.

Lastly, officer Snow testified

that defendant told him O'Neill had given her the checkbook with
the suggestion that defendant also try to "pass" some checks
around town (T. 92). Defendant's possession of the checkbook does
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not by itself prove that the defendant had the requisite purpose
to defraud, but it clearly tends to establish as more probable
than not that defendant acted with intent to defraud.

Thus the

checkbook meets the requirement for relevant evidence under rule
401 and is admissible under rule 402.
Defendant argues that even if possession of the
checkbook was relevant to reveal her state of mind, its probative
value was outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" under rule 403.
The basis of defendant's argument is that the admission of the
checkbook "may have misled or confused the jury into considering
facts of crimes not at issue or alleged by the State."
(Appellant's Brief at 16). The argument is insufficient.
In first evaluating the* probative value of defendant's
possession of the checkbook in evidencing her state of mind it
must be recognized that the burden was on the State to prove
defendant's culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1) & (2)(b) (1990). In this case it was
necessary for the State to marshal all circumstantial evidence
which tended to show that defendant had acted with the requisite
culpable state of mind. Defendant's possession of the checkbook,
with all that such possession connoted, was a necessary part of
that showing.
As to unfair prejudice, defendant has failed to
identify just how the admission of the checkbook has unfairly
prejudiced her or unfairly influenced the jury.
-20-

Cotner was

allowed to testify, without objection, that the purse containing
the checkbook had been missing since the day before the incident
in question and that defendant was unknown to her and did not
have her authorization to use the checkbook (T. 76-79).

Cotner

also testified, again without objection, that one of defendant's
male companions was the same man whom she had seen in the store
where she last saw her purse (T. 77 and 88-89).

As to the

checkbook itself, it was far less related to any conjecture the
jury might have formed about defendant's possible relation to any
theft than was the aforementioned testimony.

Thus, in the face

of defendant's failure at trial to object to, or raise as an
issue on appeal as to, testimony suggesting defendant's possible
relation to a theft, defendant's allegation that the admission of
the checkbook was prejudicial is without substance.

In any

event, any prejudice resulting from the admission of the
checkbook was amply cured by the State's notice to the jury, in
closing argument, that "[defendant's] not charged with theft of
this checkbook.

She's not charged with anything other than

passing this check." (T. 159). The trial court's jury
instructions stated, in pertinent part: "You are to be governed
solely by the evidence introduced in this trial;" followed by,
"You should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel
made during the trial, unless such statement was made as an
admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or
facts." (R. 54 and 67) (emphasis added).

Thus, the trial court

effectively reinforced the State's acknowledgment that only
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defendant's guilt for forgery was at issue. The trial court also
instructed the jury that "[t]he law forbids you to be governed by
mere . . . conjecture." (R. 54).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction
submitted to the jury was inadequate in light of the recent
United States Supreme Court decision, Cage v. Louisiana, 111
S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990). This Court has previously approved the
precise instruction given in this case after having considered
the directives of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson/ 774
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1989). State v. Pederson, 802 P.2d 1328 ( Utah Ct. App. 1990) (a
copy of the instruction is attached hereto as Addendum B ) .
However, defendant contends that the jury instructions
in Cage v. Louisiana and the instant case are so similar that the
instruction must necessarily be construed to be invalid.

In

support, defendant asserts that both instructions "have a
presumption of innocence clause," both require acquittal if the
state does not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
both state that reasonable doubt need not be proven to an
absolute certainty, both define a reasonable doubt as one based
on reason and one that a reasonable person would entertain, and
both disallow a reasonable doubt to be one that is merely
fanciful, imaginary or wholly speculative (Appellant's Brief at
17-18 n.6).

However, none of these aspects of the instruction
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were found to be constitutionally defective in Cage, and
defendant's own jury instruction also includes each of these
clauses (a copy of defendant's proposed instruction is attached
hereto as Addendum C ) . Defendant does not assert that his
proposed instruction is defective pursuant to Cage, and his
skewed attack on the instruction given by the trial court must
fail.
Cage condemned the combined use of phrases equating a
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial
doubt," and "moral certainty."

The combination of this

terminology, even when viewed in the context of the- instructions
as a whole, allowed for a "finding of guilt based on a degree of
proof below that required by the Due Process Clause."
S. Ct. at 329-30.
case.

Cage, 111

But, these terms were not used in defendant's

Therefore, Cage has no applicability to the instant

instruction.

Accord State of Idaho v. Rhoades, 1991 WL 15607

(Idaho Feb. 13, 1991); Lord v. State of Nevada, 1991 WL 13535
(Nev. Feb. 7, 1991).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
DATED this

A

day of April, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in
a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method
of recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to
be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or any agency thereof; or
(b) A check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks,
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or
claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any
person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be
a check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A
misdemeanor.

PART 3
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-301. Person under fourteen years old not criminally
responsible.
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before he
reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the
jurisdiction of or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state.

76-2-302. Compulsion.
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribe!
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not
have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the' presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1) provided.

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made
at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit
a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.

76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal
law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his
conduct did not constitute an offense, and

76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.
(1) It is not a defense to the crime of child kidnaping, a violation of Section
76-5-301.1; rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; sodomy upon a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-403.1; or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section
76-5-404.1; or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, that the actor
mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age.
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a violation of Section 76-5-401, or an attempt to commit that crime, that the actor
mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the
alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-304.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, ! 2.

76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influence of
alcohol or other substance voluntarily consumed
— Definition.
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
(2) The defense defined in this section includes the defenses known as "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity."
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected
alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged
offense is not excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental
illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may
be a congenital condition or one the result of injury or a residual effect of a
physical or mental disease. Mental illness does not mean a personality or
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct.

76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for
that offense.

76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts prior to offense.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution in which an actor's criminal
responsibility arises from his own conduct or from being a party to an offense
under Section 76-2-201 [76-2-202] that prior to the commission of the offense,
the actor voluntarily terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either:
(1) Gave timely warning to the proper law enforcement authorities or
the intended victim; or
(2) Wholly deprives his prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission

76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.
Defenses enumerated in this part constitute affirmative defenses.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ARTICLE IV,
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.
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APPENDIX C

INSTRUCTION NO.

A defendant is presumed innocent unless that defendant is
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

If you have a reasonable

doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.

The burden is

upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The statefs evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require proof to
an absolute certainty.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and
women would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of
evidence in this case.

Depending upon the circumstances,

possibilities may create a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless,

reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or
imaginary, or is based upon a wholly speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and
resonable doubt.

eliminates all

A determination that a defendant has committed a

crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason,
impartiality and common sense.

You must have greater assurance of

the correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life.

The reason

for this standard is that you cannot undo your verdict once you have
announced it.

In your personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to undo or
modify the consequences of decisions you make.
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